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ALL WATCHED OVER BY MACHINES OF 
LOVING GRACE:  BORDER SEARCHES OF 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Sean O’Grady* 
 
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment has historically 
given the U.S. government the right to conduct suspicionless searches of the 
belongings of any individual crossing the border.  The federal government 
relies on the border search exception to search and detain travelers’ 
electronic devices at the border without a warrant or individualized 
suspicion. 
The government’s justification for suspicionless searches of electronic 
devices under the traditional border search exception for travelers’ property 
has recently been called into question in a series of federal court decisions.  
In March 2013, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cotterman became the 
first federal circuit court to rule that a border search of an electronic device 
may require reasonable suspicion that its owner committed a crime due to 
the privacy impact of such a search.  The following year, in Riley v. 
California (a nonborder search case), the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly 
endorsed the view that searches of cell phones implicate privacy concerns 
far beyond those implicated by searches of other physical items.  Most 
recently, two divergent circuit court decisions, United States v. Kolsuz and 
United States v. Touset, lay bare the conflict in the federal circuit courts 
between a view that border searches of electronic devices are no different 
than those of other personal property and an emerging sense that digital 
border searches merit additional scrutiny due to their increased likelihood 
to harm travelers’ Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 
This Note proposes that courts should extend the logic of Riley to the 
border by treating searches of travelers’ electronic devices as distinctly more 
harmful to Fourth Amendment interests than searches of other types of 
property.  This Note argues that border searches of electronic devices should 
be justified by a standard of at least reasonable suspicion in order to balance 
the necessity of border searches with the adverse impact on Fourth 
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Amendment privacy concerns caused by extensive searches of travelers’ 
digital devices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2017, two U.S. citizens traveling from Canada to Vermont were 
detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers while 
crossing the border.1  Customs officers gave no reason for the search:  a CBP 
supervisor told the travelers that they were being detained and that their 
smartphones were being searched because he “simply felt like ordering a 
secondary inspection.”2  One of the travelers, who wears a headscarf in 
accordance with her religious beliefs, refused to give a male CBP officer 
permission to search her phone because it contained photographs of her 
 
 1. Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *5 (D. Mass. May 
9, 2018). 
 2. Id. 
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without her headscarf.3  After approximately six hours of detention, the 
travelers departed without their phones, which were returned damaged fifteen 
days later.4 
A 2009 CBP policy in force at the time of these border searches permitted 
“confiscation of electronic devices for on- or off-site search without any level 
of suspicion.”5  Recognizing this, law enforcement officials have ordered 
border searches of travelers’ devices to gather evidence of crimes unrelated 
to the import or export of contraband.6  This policy has forced certain 
travelers—including lawyers who need to protect attorney-client privilege, 
business people with proprietary information, researchers who promise their 
subjects anonymity, and photojournalists who may pledge to blur a face to 
conceal an identity—to take precautions to minimize data on electronic 
devices they take across the U.S. border.7 
The border search doctrine, which dates back to this country’s founding 
era, exempts government searches of travelers’ belongings from the 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless searches and 
seizures.8  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly justified this exemption 
by reasoning that “the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority 
to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.”9  
The long-standing border search doctrine permits extensive, intrusive, 
suspicionless searches of property at the border—but places limits on 
invasive searches of a traveler’s body.10 
The government routinely conducts suspicionless searches of travelers’ 
electronic devices at the border in accordance with the traditional border 
search doctrine.11  Federal courts initially rejected Fourth Amendment 
 
 3. See id. 
 4. The traveler contended that CBP’s search and seizure of one phone “damaged its 
functionality.” See id. 
 5. See id. (noting that “the 2009 CBP Policy did not distinguish between a basic and 
advanced search and no level of suspicion was required for either”). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Jae Shik Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 46 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(describing a law enforcement officer’s border search of a traveler’s laptop as “nothing more 
than a fishing expedition to discover what [the traveler] might have been up to”). 
 7. See David K. Shipler, Can You Frisk a Hard Drive?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/weekinreview/20laptop.html [https://perma.cc/3X45-
U3NE]. 
 8. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617–18 (1977). 
 9. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004); see also United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–17. 
 10. Compare Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154–56 (upholding the suspicionless 
disassembly of a car’s fuel tank), with Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (holding that 
the extended, nonroutine detention of a traveler at the border was justified by customs officers’ 
reasonable suspicion that the traveler was smuggling drugs in a body cavity). 
 11. See, e.g., Mana Azarmi & Greg Nojeim, Border Searches of Electronic Devices:  Oh, 
the Places Your Data Will Go, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://cdt.org/blog/border-searches-of-electronic-devices-oh-the-places-your-data-will-go/ 
[https://perma.cc/XW6E-CWBZ]; Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, New CBP Border Device 
Search Policy Still Permits Unconstitutional Searches, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 
8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/new-cbp-border-device-search-policy-still-
permits-unconstitutional-searches [https://perma.cc/6WL4-UZFU]. 
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challenges to border searches of electronic devices on the grounds that cell 
phones and computers are no different than other forms of property.12  More 
recent cases suggest the emergence of a view that searches of electronic 
devices implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests more than searches 
of other types of personal property.13  In 2013, the Ninth Circuit held in 
United States v. Cotterman14 that the Fourth Amendment requires border 
agents to show reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before undertaking 
a “forensic” search of a computer.15  In Riley v. California,16 a nonborder 
decision issued the following year, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
view that searches of cell phones should be treated the same as searches of 
other types of property.  In Riley, a unanimous Court declared that searches 
of “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far 
beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a 
purse.”17  Following Cotterman and Riley, a split emerged in the circuit 
courts over whether to extend Riley’s privacy-focused treatment of electronic 
devices to the border.18 
Millions of people cross the United States border carrying cell phones and 
electronic devices every day.19  On a typical day in the 2017 fiscal year, 
American border officials processed 1,088,300 incoming passengers and 
pedestrians, including 283,664 private vehicles.20  The vast majority of 
Americans—95 percent—own a cell phone, with 77 percent of Americans 
now owning a smartphone.21  Nearly all of those travelers carried a 
 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment does not protect electronic devices—including computers and cell 
phones—from warrantless and suspicionless searches in the border context); United States v. 
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504–05 (4th Cir. 2005) (same); see also United States v. Linarez-
Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that there is no reasonable suspicion 
required for a routine border search of “[d]ata storage media and electronic equipment, such 
as films, computer devices, and videotapes”). 
 13. See Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches After Riley v. 
California, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1979–82 (2015). 
 14. 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 15. Id. at 956–57. 
 16. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 17. Id. at 2488–89. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See Patrick G. Lee, Can Customs and Border Officials Search Your Phone?  These 
Are Your Rights, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 13, 2017, 12:55 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
can-customs-border-protection-search-phone-legal-rights [https://perma.cc/85LK-2GLN]. 
 20. On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2017, CBP . . ., U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2017 
[https://perma.cc/82X8-RHGT].  In all, approximately 226.9 million air passengers traveled 
between the United States and the rest of the world in 2017.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIR PASSENGER AND FREIGHT STATISTICS 3 (2017), 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/office-policy/aviation-
policy/311371/us-international-air-passenger-and-freight-statistics-december-2017_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SLS9-L3BA] (noting a 5 percent increase in passengers from the previous 
year). 
 21. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/7J7M-N4P3] (noting that the smartphone figure is up from just 
35 percent since 2011).  In fact, approximately 90 percent of U.S. households contain at least 
one internet-connected electronic device (smartphone, desktop or laptop computer, tablet, or 
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smartphone or laptop,22 which means that nearly all of those devices were 
subject to warrantless, suspicionless searches by U.S. border officials.23 
Customs officers stationed at the U.S. border and at airports searched an 
estimated 30,200 cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices of 
people entering and leaving the United States in 2017—an almost 60 percent 
increase from 2016.24  In fact, U.S. border officials searched more phones in 
a single month of 2017 than in all of 2015.25  CBP officials claim that border 
searches of electronic devices “are critical to the detection of evidence 
relating to terrorism and other national security matters, human and bulk cash 
smuggling, contraband, and child pornography.”26  Privacy activists and 
those who have been detained at the border say the examination of phones, 
computers, and hard drives is invasive and violates Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches.27 
This Note addresses the application of the border search exception to 
electronic devices.28  The Supreme Court has not yet decided how Fourth 
Amendment protections apply to this situation.29  Based on the traditional 
border search exception to Fourth Amendment protection, border officials 
may conduct “routine” searches of persons and personal property without 
suspicion of criminal activity or a warrant.30  The Court has indicated that 
some “nonroutine” searches—including those destructive to personal 
 
streaming media device), with the median American household containing five of them.  See 
A Third of Americans Live in a Household with Three or More Smartphones, PEW RES. CTR. 
(May 25, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/25/a-third-of-americans-live-
in-a-household-with-three-or-more-smartphones/ [https://perma.cc/7NR6-CJZV]. 
 22. PORTABLE ELEC. DEVICES AVIATION RULEMAKING COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
EXPANDING THE USE OF PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES DURING FLIGHT H-8 (2013), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/ped/media/PED_ARC_FINAL_REPORT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q2E4-4A7B] (noting that “[n]early all (94%) U.S. adult airline passengers 
have brought at least one [portable electronic device] with them onto an aircraft while traveling 
in the past 12 months”). 
 23. See generally, e.g., Border Security:  America’s Front Line (Force Four Entertainment 
2018) (depicting numerous warrantless border searches of cell phones by U.S. customs 
officers over the course of a twenty-eight-episode reality television series). 
 24. Ron Nixon, Cellphone and Computer Searches at U.S. Border Rise Under Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/politics/trump-border-
search-cellphone-computer.html [https://perma.cc/JGH8-NP5Q]. 
 25. See Tim Cushing, Phone Searches Now Default Mode at the Border; More Searches 
Last Month Than in All of 2015, TECHDIRT (Mar. 14, 2017, 10:49 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170314/08063936914/phone-searches-now-default-
mode-border-more-searches-last-month-than-all-2015.shtml [http://perma.cc/3ysc-wcav]. 
 26. Olivia Solon, US Border Agents Are Doing ‘Digital Strip Searches’.  Here’s How to 
Protect Yourself, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/ 
mar/31/us-border-phone-computer-searches-how-to-protect [https://perma.cc/Z69N-KVCZ].  
Electronic devices “can also reveal information about financial and commercial crimes, such 
as those relating to copyright, trademark and export control violations.” Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Azarmi & Nojeim, supra note 11; Nixon, supra note 24. 
 28. This Note will not distinguish between the Fourth Amendment rights or privacy 
expectations of U.S. citizens and noncitizens at the border. 
 29. See infra Part I.B.; see also Miller, supra note 13, at 1944–45. 
 30. See Miller, supra note 13, at 1944–45. 
2260 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
property or highly intrusive to personal dignity—may require some level of 
suspicion.31 
This Note analyzes the two alternative approaches taken by federal circuit 
courts to the border search exception as it applies to electronic devices.32  The 
traditional approach treats border searches of cell phones or other electronic 
devices as analytically equivalent to searches of physical items that require 
no individualized suspicion to search.33  Other courts emphasize the special 
privacy concerns presented by suspicionless searches of electronic devices 
and call for a narrower application of the border search exception to digital 
devices.34  The circuit split has adverse consequences for customs officials 
working at airports and border crossings across the United States:  whether a 
border guard needs reasonable suspicion to search your electronic devices 
depends on where you enter the country.35 
Part I of this Note provides background information on the nature of the 
Fourth Amendment’s traditional warrant requirement and its border search 
exception.  This breakdown considers recent Supreme Court rulings 
regarding Fourth Amendment rights at the border. 
Part II analyzes the current conflict among the U.S. courts of appeals in 
how the border search exception should be applied to travelers’ now-
ubiquitous electronic devices.  The Note divides the courts into two groups:  
(1) those holding that the heightened privacy implications of a nonroutine 
border search of a traveler’s electronic device call for some form of 
individualized suspicion, and (2) those advocating the traditional position 
that searches of property at the border may be conducted without any 
individualized suspicion. 
Part III argues that Riley endorses a burgeoning understanding of 
electronic devices as a special category of property subject to heightened 
privacy concerns.  This Note argues that all border searches of electronic 
devices are therefore nonroutine and require some form of individualized 
suspicion.  This Note concludes by offering several legal and public policy 
justifications for extending Riley’s logic to the border and (partially) endorses 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ understanding of the border search doctrine as 
it applies to electronic devices. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PRIVACY AT THE BORDER 
Though many issues involved in searches of electronic devices are new, 
the border search exception itself dates back to the country’s founding era.  
This Part reviews the case law underpinning the traditional border search 
 
 31. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. See infra Part II.B; see also infra Part I.B. 
 34. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. 
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); infra Part II.A. 
 35. See Ayako Hobbs, Tara Swaminatha & Thomas Zeno, Circuits Split About Border 
Search of Electronic Devices, ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.anticorruptionblog.com/data-protection-privacy/circuits-split-about-border-
search-of-electronic-devices/ [https://perma.cc/ZQT9-DHTQ]. 
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doctrine and the application of border search principles to electronic devices.  
It also details recent developments in electronic privacy jurisprudence that 
may impact the search of digital devices at the border. 
A.  The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”36  The Fourth Amendment applies when an individual 
demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy and society recognizes that 
expectation as reasonable.37 
In order for a search or seizure to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, it must 
be “reasonable.”38  “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable” in the 
absence of “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”; the police cannot 
simply search an individual’s house or car at random.39  A reasonable search 
“generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant” supported by probable 
cause.40  According to ordinary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a search 
or seizure accomplished without a judicial warrant issued upon a showing of 
probable cause is per se unreasonable.41 
In the absence of a warrant, a search or seizure is reasonable only if it falls 
within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.42  The Supreme Court 
imposes a presumptive warrant requirement for searches and seizures43 and 
generally requires probable cause for a warrantless search or seizure to be 
“reasonable.”44  There are a number of important exceptions to this general 
warrant requirement, and in practice many searches are conducted without a 
warrant or probable cause.45 
Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to permit certain types of 
searches and seizures as exceptions to the warrant requirement.46  Advances 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 37. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (“Our Fourth Amendment 
analysis embraces two questions.  First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has 
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy . . . .  Second, we inquire whether the individual’s 
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” (quoting 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979))). 
 38. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
403 (2006))). 
 39. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 40. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 
(1995)). 
 41. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). 
 42. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). 
 43. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for searches 
and seizures unless a preexisting exception applies). 
 44. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 143 (2013); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; 
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14–15. 
 45. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451–52 (2015); Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1984). 
 46. See, e.g. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 & n.19. 
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in technology brought challenges to the warrant requirement to the Supreme 
Court.47  Even in these exceptional cases, the Supreme Court generally 
requires the government to demonstrate probable cause48 or a lower standard 
called “reasonable suspicion”49 in order for the search to be considered 
reasonable.50  Warrantless searches are typically justified when the process 
of obtaining a judicial warrant would be impracticable or counterproductive 
to the government’s interests.51 
B.  The Border Search Exception 
Border searches have historically been viewed as one exception to the 
individualized-suspicion requirement.52  Routine border searches are 
permitted absent any individualized suspicion because “the Government’s 
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith 
at the international border.”53  However, more intrusive, nonroutine searches 
may require a showing of a lower level of individualized suspicion:  
reasonable suspicion.54 
1.  History of the Border Search Exception 
Border searches are among the earliest recognized exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment requirements of a warrant and probable cause.55  The same 
Congress that passed the Fourth Amendment passed the Act of July 31, 1789, 
which allowed border officials to conduct warrantless searches of vessels 
entering the United States.56 
 
 47. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment implications of 
electronic eavesdropping); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (discussing the 
Fourth Amendment implications of an automobile search). 
 48. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1963) (stating that a warrantless seizure 
must be supported by probable cause to believe that the person has committed the violation in 
question). 
 49. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 123 (2000); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968). 
 50. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155–56 (noting that probable cause is a “reasonableness” 
standard for warrantless searches and seizures); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983) (“[C]ertain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable 
suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.”); Hill v. California, 401 
U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (“[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618–20 (1989); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. 
 52. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–18 (1977). 
 53. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 54. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
 55. The power of customs officials to conduct searches at the border has an “impressive 
historical pedigree.” United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983); see also 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–18; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925); Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623–24 (1886). 
 56. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150 (“As [the Act of July 31, 1789] was passed by the same 
Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear 
that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 
‘unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.”). 
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This Act established a series of customs offices and gave officials “full 
power and authority” to enter and search “any ship or vessel, in which they 
shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty 
shall be concealed” and to secure any such items that were found.57  The Act 
specifically differentiated between searches conducted on ships at ports of 
entry—where “full power and authority” were directly granted without need 
for judicial oversight—and those of “any particular dwelling-house, store, 
building, or other place” for which the agents needed to obtain a warrant.58  
Therefore, searches at the border could be conducted at the discretion of the 
customs agents, whereas searches by customs agents for smuggled goods at 
nonborder locations were subject to an external warrant requirement.  This 
waiver of the warrant requirement at the border is the core of the border 
search exception, and it has been in place since 1789.59  The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly pointed to the long history of the border search exception as 
support for its constitutionality.60 
Traditionally, searches conducted at the border or its “functional 
equivalent”61 do not require any suspicion on the theory that the government 
has a strong sovereign interest in regulating what enters and exits the 
country.62  The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the federal 
government’s right and obligation to protect the nation’s borders in absolutist 
terms.63  The Fourth Amendment does not require warrants for routine stops 
and searches at borders because the sovereign state and its public officials64 
 
 57. Act of July 31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43, repealed by Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 74, 1 
Stat. 145, 178. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537–38. 
 60. See, e.g., Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–17 (noting that the First Congress also proposed 
the Bill of Rights, and that the First Congress therefore can be presumed not to have thought 
the Act inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623 (observing that “the 
seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws . . . has been authorized by English 
statutes for at least two centuries past”). 
 61. International airports are included as “functional equivalents” of the border. See, e.g., 
United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the border search 
exception applies at international airports because it is the “functional equivalent of a border”); 
United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the border search 
exception applies at the customs gate at Chicago O’Hare International Airport); United States 
v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the border search exception applied at 
an airport in Puerto Rico because the traveler was departing on an international flight).  But 
see, e.g., United States v. Mayer, 818 F.2d 725, 727–28 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that the 
functional-equivalent-of-border exception did not apply to a domestic airport where there was 
uncertainty as to whether the plane had come from Mexico). 
 62. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004). 
 63. See id. at 153 (“It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent 
authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.”); Ramsey, 
431 U.S. at 616 (“[S]earches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the 
sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this 
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”). 
 64. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (2012) (authorizing warrantless searches at the border by 
immigration officials); 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2012) (permitting warrantless Coast Guard 
inspections, searches, and seizures on the high seas and in U.S. waters); 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) 
(2012) (authorizing customs officers to search any vessel or vehicle anywhere inside the 
United States, within customs waters, or in any other authorized place without a warrant). 
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have the right to protect the United States by stopping and examining persons 
and property entering65 or leaving66 the country.  The Supreme Court has 
largely embraced this principle of sovereign prerogative in its Fourth 
Amendment border search doctrine.67 
Modern border search cases have typically concerned the smuggling of 
controlled substances and involved the government applying the border 
search exception to new situations and emerging technologies.68  In the 
Prohibition-era case Carroll v. United States,69 the Court used the border 
search doctrine as a point of comparison in devising a new exception to the 
warrant requirement for a nonborder search of automobiles within the 
country.70  The Carroll Court said that “[t]ravellers may be so stopped 
[without cause] in crossing an international boundary because of national self 
protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself 
as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully 
brought in.”71  Domestic automobile searches, in contrast, were held to 
require probable cause (though not a warrant) because the state does not have 
the same set of strong national defense interests in the nation’s interior that 
it does at the border, where a search is presumptively reasonable even without 
probable cause.72 
The Court echoed Carroll over fifty years later in United States v. 
Ramsey73 and stated that the sovereign has a strong interest in controlling 
“who and what may enter the country.”74  In Ramsey, the Court upheld a 
statute giving postal inspectors the power to open and inspect packages 
without a warrant if they had “reasonable cause to suspect” that the package 
contained contraband.75  In holding the statute constitutional, the Court stated 
that the proposition “[t]hat searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-
standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining 
 
 65. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (holding that 
the government has “plenary authority” to conduct routine warrantless searches “to prevent 
the introduction of contraband”); see also Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (holding that the 
government may search a vehicle crossing the border because of its “interest in preventing the 
entry of unwanted persons and effects”). 
 66. See, e.g., Beras, 183 F.3d at 26 (noting widespread agreement among the circuit courts 
that the border search exception applies to outgoing as well as incoming travelers). 
 67. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472–73 (1979) (“The authority of the 
United States to search the baggage of arriving international travelers is based on its inherent 
sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity.”); see also Benjamin J. Rankin, Note, 
Restoring Privacy at the Border:  Extending the Reasonable Suspicion Standard for Laptop 
Border Searches, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301, 306–07 (2011). 
 68. See Sid Nadkarni, “Let’s Have a Look, Shall We?”  A Model for Evaluating 
Suspicionless Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA L. REV. 146, 184–
86 (2013). 
 69. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 70. See id. at 153–54.  The case concerned the smuggling of alcohol during Prohibition. 
See id. at 159–60. 
 71. Id. at 154. 
 72. See id. 
 73. 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
 74. See id. at 620. 
 75. Id. at 607–08.  The package in question turned out to contain heroin. Id. at 610–11. 
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persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by 
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border” required “no extended 
demonstration.”76 
Under Ramsey, officials may conduct routine border searches without a 
warrant or probable cause when those searches are tethered to the 
government’s interest in examining persons and property seeking entrance to 
the United States.77  The Court, however, expressly reserved judgment on the 
question of “whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might 
be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner in 
which it is carried out.”78 
2.  Routine and Nonroutine Privacy Intrusions at the Border 
Two aspects of the Court’s modern border search decisions obscure the 
clarity of its underlying principles:  (1) the reasonableness balancing test, and 
(2) the distinction between “routine” and “nonroutine” border searches.79  As 
weighing individual privacy interests against government intrusions became 
a more common element of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,80 
that balancing test began to crop up in the Court’s border search opinions.81  
The Court also stated that an individualized level of suspicion may be 
necessary for some intrusions beyond the scope of “routine” customs 
searches and inspections.82 
There are two broad categories of border searches:  “routine” and 
“nonroutine.”83  A “routine” search of a person and his or her effects crossing 
an international border into the United States is not subject to any 
requirement of reasonable suspicion that an item contains contraband or 
evidence of criminal activity.84  Border officials can conduct “routine” 
searches without any individualized suspicion.85 
On the other hand, a “nonroutine” search involving a high degree of 
personal intrusion—such as a strip search—requires “reasonable suspicion,” 
which calls for some particularized and objective basis for suspecting 
 
 76. Id. at 616. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 618 n.13. 
 79. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 
§ 10.2.1, at 592–93 (3d ed. 2017). 
 80. Id. § 11.3.4, at 706 (describing the rise of the Supreme Court’s balancing test for 
privacy interests in the 1960s). 
 81. Still, the Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is 
qualitatively different at the international border.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); see also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616–19. 
 82. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539–41 (upholding a nonroutine, sixteen-hour 
detention of an individual who was reasonably suspected of smuggling drugs into the country 
in her alimentary canal); cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 n.3 (2004) 
(observing that “delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected”). 
 83. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. 
 84. Id. at 537–38. 
 85. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (quoting Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538). 
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wrongdoing.86  A search crosses the threshold and becomes nonroutine if it 
is either particularly offensive (such as an intrusive search of the body) or 
physically destructive.87  Courts have recognized that nonroutine border 
searches require a greater level of suspicion than routine searches.88 
Although the government possesses broad powers to conduct suspicionless 
border searches and seizures, the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
generally required at least reasonable suspicion for nonroutine border 
searches.89  These invasive searches, which significantly intrude on an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, require a minimal showing of 
reasonable suspicion.90  The Supreme Court views the privacy interests 
implicated by a seizure of an international traveler at the border differently 
than those involved in the seizure of a person walking the streets of the 
interior United States.91  Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
stated what distinguishes a routine from a nonroutine border search, circuit 
courts have typically examined several factors in making such a 
determination.92 
Circuit courts generally agree that the degree of intrusiveness is 
determinative of the suspicion required to necessitate the search.93  Lengthy 
 
 86. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–42; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968) (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”). 
 87. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 703 (5th Cir. 2003) (requiring 
reasonable individualized suspicion for detentions at immigration checkpoints); United States 
v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 267–68 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring reasonable suspicion for 
nonroutine border searches). 
 89. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540–41; Nadkarni, supra note 68, at 161–63. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(requiring reasonable suspicion for a forensic search of a laptop seized at the border). 
 91. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (“The crux of this case . . . [is] whether there was 
justification for [the officer’s] invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for 
weapons in the course of that investigation.”), with Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 
(“Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of 
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”), and United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels 
of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (“Import restrictions and searches of persons 
or packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different rules of 
constitutional law from domestic regulations.”). 
 92. See United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988).  The First Circuit 
considers six factors when determining whether a search is “nonroutine”: 
(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or requires the 
suspect to disrobe; 
(ii) whether physical contact between Customs officials and the suspect occurs 
during the search; 
(iii) whether force is used to effect the search; 
(iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger; 
(v) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and 
(vi) whether the suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated 
by the search[.] 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the 
invasion of the privacy and dignity of the individual” is the “key variable” in determining 
whether a border search was routine or nonroutine (quoting United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 
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detentions and highly intrusive searches of the person—such as strip 
searches,94 extended customs detentions,95 or body-cavity searches96—
require some level of particularized suspicion due to their impact on the 
“dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched.”97  The Supreme 
Court, however, has never squarely addressed the issue of what level of 
suspicion these searches require.98 
The Supreme Court has thus far explicitly limited the routine-nonroutine 
distinction to those cases involving searches of persons rather than searches 
of property.99  In United States v. Flores-Montano,100 the Court declared that 
“[c]omplex balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a 
vehicle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have no place in 
border searches of vehicles.”101  Most searches of travelers’ luggage, 
personal effects, and vehicles are found to be sufficiently nonintrusive with 
regard to individual privacy and dignity interests to qualify as routine border 
searches that do not require individualized suspicion.102  When the courts 
first applied the Fourth Amendment to border searches of computers, they 
 
1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981))); Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 203–04 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the intrusiveness of a border search determines whether that border search was 
routine or nonroutine); United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
“the ‘degree of intrusiveness’” is “the ‘critical factor’” in determining whether a border search 
is routine (quoting United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2002))); 
United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that “[r]outine border 
inspections” do not “embarrass or offend the average traveler”). 
 94. See, e.g., Bradley, 299 F.3d at 203–04 (contrasting a routine pat-down with a 
nonroutine strip search); United States v. Reyes, 821 F.2d 168, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(requiring reasonable suspicion that the defendant was concealing contraband to justify a strip 
search at the border). 
 95. See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 836–37 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
reasonable suspicion justified extended detention for travelers suspected of smuggling drugs). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Handy, 788 F.2d 1419, 1420–21 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring 
a “clear indication” that the defendant carried drugs internally to justify a body-cavity search 
at the border); United States v. Pino, 729 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring 
articulable suspicion that a defendant is carrying drugs in his rectal area to justify a cavity 
search). 
 97. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
 98. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985) (“[W]e 
suggest no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches 
such as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he reasons that might support a 
requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to 
vehicles.”). 
 100. 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 101. Id. at 152. 
 102. See id. at 154–55 (holding that a search of a vehicle that included disassembly and 
reassembly of a fuel tank qualified as routine because it did not damage the vehicle and was 
completed in one hour); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (holding 
that the thorough search of a car at the border was not sufficiently intrusive to qualify as 
nonroutine border search); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the search of luggage at an airport was not sufficiently intrusive to qualify as a 
nonroutine search); United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a pat-
down search of a departing international traveler’s legs was not sufficiently intrusive to qualify 
as a nonroutine border search). 
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held that searches of computers were ordinary searches that did not require 
suspicion.103  Searches that physically damage or destroy the property will 
also be subject to a reasonable suspicion requirement,104 but the Supreme 
Court has never held that reasonable suspicion is required for a 
nondestructive property search at the border.105 
In the wake of Flores-Montano, there is an open question whether the 
“dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched” ever require 
limitations on searches of property at the border.106  The Court’s holding that 
these interests were insufficiently implicated by a vehicle search could be 
taken as either a conclusion about searches of a specific type of property or 
as a general statement about all property searches.107  Unsurprisingly, lower 
court judges trying to apply Flores-Montano to searches of electronic devices 
have differed on this point.108 
3.  The Scope of Privacy Intrusions in the Digital Context 
Electronic devices pose novel challenges for the border search doctrine.109  
With technological advancements, the privacy implications of a rule at one 
time may be vastly different than the implications of that same rule at a later 
point in time.110  If laptops are viewed as simply pieces of property traveling 
across the border, then the traditional border search doctrine provides little 
support for requiring any elevated degree of suspicion for their search.111 
Critics of the traditional border search doctrine argue that searches of 
laptops or smartphones are analogous to intrusive searches of the body due 
to the sensitive personal information potentially stored on those devices.112  
 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506–08 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 104. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n.2 (distinguishing permissible suspicionless 
disassembly and reassembly of a fuel tank from “potentially destructive drilling”); see, e.g., 
United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367–68 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that drilling into a metal 
trailer was a nonroutine border search requiring reasonable suspicion); United States v. 
Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that drilling into a metal cylinder was a 
nonroutine search that was justified by the government’s reasonable suspicion). 
 105. See Nadkarni, supra note 68, at 161–62. 
 106. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. 
 107. See id.; infra Part II. 
 108. See infra Part II. 
 109. See Orin S. Kerr, Every Computer Border Search Requires Case-by-Case 
Reasonableness, DC Court Holds, REASON:  VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 12, 2015, 2:01 AM), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2015/05/12/every-computer-border-search-r [https://perma.cc/KF 
4D-3PXQ]. 
 110. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, in SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (THE FOURTH AMENDMENT):  ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 230, 231 (Cynthia Lee ed., 
2011) (describing the declining social importance of public telephones between the 1960s and 
2010s). 
 111. See, e.g., Erick Lucadamo, Note, Reading Your Mind at the Border:  Searching 
Memorialized Thoughts and Memories on Your Laptop and United States v. Arnold, 54 VILL. 
L. REV. 541, 570–71 (2009). 
 112. See, e.g., Kindal Wright, Comment, Border Searches in a Modern World:  Are 
Laptops Merely Closed Containers, or Are They Something More?, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 701, 
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“While computers are compact at a physical level, every computer is akin to 
a vast warehouse of information.”113  A brief search of a smartphone—much 
less a forensic analysis of the device—reveals intimate data such as a user’s 
personal photos, internet search histories, and email correspondence going 
back for many years.  If the device is connected to the cloud, then the 
investigator has virtually unlimited access to a person’s digital existence.114  
Thus, critics reason that searches of laptops, which may expose a person’s 
innermost thoughts, are as intrusive as strip searches or body-cavity searches 
that expose the body—searches that courts subject to a reasonable suspicion 
standard.115 
This position sits uneasily with longstanding precedent regarding 
suspicionless searches of nondigital items.116  Courts have long ruled that 
border searches of intimate property such as private diaries or personal 
papers, which almost by definition contain similarly expressive, private 
materials, require no reasonable suspicion.117  Some critics therefore charge 
that computers are no different than any other kind of property carried across 
the border.118  A district court outright dismissed the concerns expressed in 
Riley about searching digital technology:  “Laptops and cell phones are 
indeed becoming quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, different from 
other items, but that simply means there is more room to hide digital 
contraband, and therefore more storage space that must be searched.”119 
Forensic searches of electronic devices can represent distinctly intrusive 
searches because users are often unaware of what they are carrying on any 
 
702 (2009) (concluding that the “proper analogy” for a laptop computer search “should not be 
that of a closed container, but that of a physical, bodily intrusion due to the large amount of 
personal memories and personal documents that can be stored on computers”). 
 113. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 542 
(2005). 
 114. A 2018 CBP report noted this concern:  “[One] privacy risk concerns CBP’s potential 
over-collection of information from individuals due to the volume of information that is either 
stored on, or accessible by, today’s electronic devices.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
DHS/CBP/PIA-008(A), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR CBP BORDER SEARCHES 
OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 2 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
PIA-CBP%20-%20Border-Searches-of-Electronic-Devices%20-January-2018%20-%20 
Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHD4-RCJT]. 
 115. See, e.g., Nadkarni, supra note 68, at 168–69; Rankin, supra note 67, at 331. 
 116. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 563 (D. Md. 2014) 
(“Although it surely is a discomforting concept, there is no principle beyond the shortness of 
life and the acknowledgement that there is only so much time available to conduct any 
particular border search that prevents a CBP officer from ‘reading a diary line by line looking 
for mention of criminal activity.’” (quoting United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962–
63 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc))). 
 118. One commentator notes that “[a] laptop is simply a new medium through which old 
ideas, information, habits, and practices are used and recorded.” Lucadamo, supra note 111, 
at 571. 
 119. United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 
2016). 
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given device.120  Most people understand how to remove items from their 
suitcase before crossing a border, but few know how to permanently remove 
unwanted files from a digital device.121  GPS technology in a vehicle, for 
example, may store much the same information as a traveler’s smartphone 
without the traveler even realizing it.122  Electronic devices are capable of 
storing “a tremendous amount of information that most users do not know 
about and cannot control.”123  Forensic search software, for example, permits 
analysts to comb through electronic devices for files “deleted” by the user.124  
This is possible because marking a file “deleted” usually only marks that file 
cluster as available to be overwritten by other files.125  Thus, “deleted” files 
are not instantly removed from the device but may remain on the device 
undisturbed for an analyst to recover them.126 
Similarly, the ubiquity of cloud computing potentially places information 
stored on remote servers in the hands of U.S. border agents.127  Until 2018, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents claimed full authority to 
search the contents of cloud devices at the border.128  Border searches gaining 
access to data in the cloud effectively raid a “virtual safe deposit box,” which 
does not itself cross the border.129 
The length of time required to undertake a thorough forensic evaluation of 
an electronic device provides another potential reason to treat searches of 
these devices as distinct from searches of other forms of property.130  
Electronic devices may be held indefinitely by the government and searched 
over extended periods of time.131  Forensic searches of electronic devices are 
 
 120. See generally SOPHIA COPE ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., DIGITAL PRIVACY AT THE 
U.S. BORDER:  PROTECTING THE DATA ON YOUR DEVICES (2017), https://www.eff.org/wp/ 
digital-privacy-us-border-2017 [https://perma.cc/C6PN-U9Q8]. 
 121. See id.; see also Matthew B. Kugler, Comment, The Perceived Intrusiveness of 
Searching Electronic Devices at the Border:  An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165, 
1184–85 (2014). 
 122. See George I. Seffers, DHS Navigates the World of Vehicular Digital Forensics, 
AFCEA:  SIGNAL (May 25, 2016), https://www.afcea.org/content/Article-dhs-navigates-
world-vehicular-digital-forensics [https://perma.cc/TP27-WKTE] (describing DHS searches 
of in-vehicle systems that “store a vast amount of data, such as recent destinations, favorite 
locations, call logs, contact lists, text messages, emails, pictures, videos, social media feeds 
and navigation history”). 
 123. Kerr, supra note 113, at 542. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Esha Bhandari, The Government’s New Policy on Device Searches at the Border:  
What You Need to Know, ACLU (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/privacy-borders-and-checkpoints/governments-new-policy-device-searches 
[https://perma.cc/RNJ7-B83Q]. 
 128. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 114, at 8 (announcing the updated 
policy that DHS officers may no longer “intentionally use the device to access information 
that is solely stored remotely”). 
 129. Kugler, supra note 121, at 1185. 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 560–61 (D. Md. 2014) 
(noting the privacy concerns implicated by the “potentially limitless duration and scope of a 
forensic search”). 
 131. See Rankin, supra note 67, at 346–47. 
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typically performed by trained analysts at a government facility away from 
the border.132  These searches can last for a period of weeks or even months, 
during which the travelers have no access to their devices.133 
C.  Searches of Electronic Devices and Data:  Riley and Carpenter 
The case with the greatest impact on the debate surrounding suspicionless 
border searches of electronic devices is Riley v. California,134 wherein the 
Supreme Court weighed in on warrantless searches of portable electronic 
devices incident to arrest.135  Prior to Riley, the Supreme Court had been 
reluctant to decide Fourth Amendment issues raised by changing privacy 
expectations with respect to electronic devices.136  As Chief Justice Roberts 
noted, “A smart phone of the sort taken from Riley was unheard of ten years 
ago; a significant majority of American adults now own such phones.”137  In 
Riley, the Supreme Court held that a warrant is required to search a cell phone 
incident to arrest because of the quantity and quality of information stored on 
the device.138  The Riley Court concluded that the traditional search-incident-
to-arrest exception did not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement 
for searches of digital devices under the usual concerns for officers’ safety or 
a fear of destruction of evidence.139 
Riley “marks a turning point in the evolution” of the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding the Fourth Amendment’s application to electronic devices.140  
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, commented 
extensively on individual privacy interests at stake when the government 
searches portable electronic devices.141  The Court took care to highlight the 
“immense storage capacity” of modern cell phones in distinguishing these 
electronic devices from other forms of personal storage, such as suitcases or 
trunks.142  The storage capacity of modern phones—the ability to “store 
millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos”143—
means that “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government 
 
 132. See id. at 320. 
 133. See Kerr, supra note 113, at 537–38; see also, e.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-
11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *21 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018) (noting the confiscation of a 
traveler’s electronic devices for ten months in one instance and fifty-six days in another). 
 134. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 135. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 13, at 1945. 
 136. The Court noted that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.” 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
 137. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
 138. See id. at 2485. 
 139. Id. at 2485–88; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) 
(establishing the search-incident-to-arrest exception’s principal concerns with officer safety 
and destruction of evidence). 
 140. CLANCY, supra note 79, § 1.5.2, at 44. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 143. Id. at 2478.  “Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received 
for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have 
read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so.” Id. at 2489. 
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far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.”144  In distinguishing 
the Court’s new approach to cell phone data searches, Chief Justice Roberts 
noted “an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not 
physical records.”145  Before the digital age, “people did not typically carry 
a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their 
day.”146 
The Riley Court also emphasized that data stored on electronic devices is 
“qualitatively different” than the data found in physical records.147  The 
browsing history of an internet-enabled phone “could reveal an individual’s 
private interests or concerns” and, through now-ubiquitous “[h]istoric 
location information, . . . can reconstruct someone’s specific movements 
down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular 
building.”148  Riley’s discussion of the privacy implications of cell phone 
searches echoes the concerns raised by Justice Sotomayor’s concurring 
opinion in United States v. Jones,149 which suggested a revision of another 
traditional search warrant exception doctrine—the third-party doctrine—in 
light of advancing cell phone technology.150 
The Riley Court concluded that, given all that modern cell phones “contain 
and all that they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of 
life.’”151  The unanimous Court’s “answer to the question of what police must 
do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly 
simple—get a warrant.”152 
In June 2018, in United States v. Carpenter,153 the Supreme Court repeated 
the privacy concerns expressed in Riley regarding cell phone data 
searches.154  In Carpenter, the Court held that the government’s warrantless 
acquisition of a suspect’s cell phone location data in a routine criminal 
investigation qualified as a search under the Fourth Amendment.155  Chief 
 
 144. Id. at 2491 (explaining that a cell phone “also contains a broad array of private 
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is [recovered as part of the 
search of a home]”). 
 145. Id. at 2490. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 150. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about 
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”); see also Elkin 
Girgenti, Computer Crimes, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 911, 941 (2018) (highlighting the influence 
of Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones on the majority’s opinion in Riley). 
 151. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)). 
 152. Id. at 2495. 
 153. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 154. David Kris, Carpenter’s Implications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, LAWFARE 
(June 24, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/carpenters-implications-foreign-
intelligence-surveillance [https://perma.cc/S77K-T9SE] (“In its reasoning and result, 
Carpenter strongly resembles the prior decision in Riley, which required a warrant for the 
search incident to an arrest of a cell phone.”). 
 155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
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Justice Roberts’s majority opinion cited Riley to illustrate a case in which 
changes in technology have necessitated a more nuanced approach.156  
Responding to Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice noted that 
“[w]hen confronting new concerns wrought by digital technology, this Court 
has been careful not to uncritically extend existing precedents.”157 
With the Supreme Court’s unclear application of this case law, the lower 
courts have reached different conclusions on how to apply this doctrine to 
border searches of electronic devices. 
II.  ELECTRONIC PRIVACY AT THE BORDER:  A SPLIT 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
Several circuit courts have heard challenges to evidence obtained during 
suspicionless border searches following the most recent major border search 
case in the Supreme Court, United States v. Flores-Montano.158  In 2013, the 
en banc Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cotterman, anticipated Riley’s 
treatment of heightened privacy concerns triggered by the Fourth 
Amendment in searches of electronic devices when it ruled that some border 
searches of digital devices require at least reasonable suspicion.159  Five 
years later, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Kolsuz,160 explicitly 
endorsed the same view:  that searches of data on electronic devices implicate 
greater privacy concerns than searches of other physical objects.161  These 
decisions, in turn, drew strong criticism from the Eleventh Circuit in United 
States v. Touset,162 which explicitly rejected Riley’s application at the border 
and reaffirmed the traditional rule that border searches of electronic devices 
are no different than searches of other physical containers—and thus deserve 
no special treatment under the Fourth Amendment.163 
A.  Extending Riley to the Border:  The Ninth Circuit in Cotterman 
and the Fourth Circuit in Kolsuz 
Between 2013 and 2018, two circuit courts ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment required at least reasonable suspicion for some border searches 
of electronic devices.  In 2013, the Ninth Circuit—whose jurisdiction 
encompasses large portions of the U.S. border with Canada and Mexico and 
 
 156. Id. at 2214. 
 157. Id. at 2222 (“A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to 
the type of brief physical search considered [in prior precedents].” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485)). 
 158. See Jim Garland & Katharine Goodloe, Federal Appeals Courts Split on Forensic 
Searches of Devices Seized at Border, COVINGTON:  INSIDE PRIVACY (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/federal-appeals-courts-split-on-forensic-
searches-of-devices-seized-at-border/ [https://perma.cc/SCK4-GGUB]; see also supra notes 
100–04 and accompanying text (discussing Flores-Montano). 
 159. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 160. 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 161. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 162. 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 163. See infra Part II.B. 
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some of the country’s busiest international airports164—ruled in United 
States v. Cotterman that a forensic search of an electronic device required 
some form of reasonable suspicion.165  Following Cotterman, the Fourth 
Circuit’s 2018 decision in Kolsuz explicitly applied Riley’s understanding of 
the unique privacy concerns raised by searches of electronic devices to the 
border.166 
1.  United States v. Cotterman 
In Cotterman, agents seized defendant Howard Cotterman’s laptop at the 
border in response to an alert based, in part, on a past conviction for child 
molestation.167  An initial search of the laptop at the border did not reveal 
incriminating material, but a comprehensive forensic examination of the 
laptop carried out 170 miles away uncovered child pornography.168  The 
lower court granted Cotterman’s motion to suppress the evidence found on 
his laptop,169 and the Ninth Circuit reversed.170  In keeping with its 
longstanding position, the Department of Justice refused to argue that there 
was reasonable suspicion for the search, which would have preserved the 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to review whether reasonable suspicion 
was required for such a search had the Court granted certiorari.171 
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit distinguished “a manual review of files on 
an electronic device” from a forensic “application of computer software to 
analyze a hard drive.”172  Judge M. Margaret McKeown, writing for the 
majority, did not explicitly label a forensic search of a laptop “nonroutine,” 
but the opinion makes clear that the “substantial personal privacy interests” 
impinged by a forensic search moves “beyond the scope of a routine customs 
search and inspection.”173 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a forensic search of a traveler’s laptop 
represented “a thorough and detailed search of the most intimate details of 
 
 164. See Map of the Ninth Circuit, U.S. CTS. FOR NINTH CIR., http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ 
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 165. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 166. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 167. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 956. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 959. 
 170. Id. at 957.  The court ultimately concluded that while government agents needed 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to undertake the forensic search of Cotterman’s 
laptop, they met that requirement. See id. 
 171. See Orin Kerr, En Banc Ninth Circuit Holds That Computer Forensic Searches Are 
like “Virtual Strip Searches” and Require Reasonable Suspicion at the Border, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/08/en-banc-ninth-circuit-
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reasonable-suspicion-at-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/UBX4-GH2H].  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari and did not hear the case. See Cotterman v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 899 (2014). 
 172. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967. 
 173. See id. at 963–64 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 
(1985)); see also supra Part I.B.1. 
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one’s life” and was “a substantial intrusion upon personal privacy and 
dignity,” which required a degree of reasonable suspicion.174  As such, the 
court analogized the examination of Cotterman’s computer to a strip search 
and concluded that such a search “intrudes upon privacy and dignity interests 
to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the border.”175  The court 
explained that the arduous process involved in the forensic examination, 
which included copying and searching Cotterman’s hard drive in its entirety 
(including ostensibly deleted files), “is akin to reading a diary line by line 
looking for mention of criminal activity—plus looking at everything the 
writer may have erased.”176 
Judge McKeown reasoned that “the uniquely sensitive nature of data on 
electronic devices carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus 
renders an exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with other 
forms of property.”177  The court noted that the existence of cloud storage 
makes searches “even more problematic” since the cloud may offer the 
government access to sensitive data held on remote servers rather than on the 
device itself.178 
The Cotterman court believed that the amount of information stored on a 
computer and the nature of that information justified its rule and observed 
that “[a] person’s digital life ought not be hijacked simply by crossing a 
border.”179  In dissent, Judge Consuelo Maria Callahan observed, “The 
majority’s opinion turns primarily on the notion that electronic devices 
deserve special consideration because they are ubiquitous and can store vast 
quantities of personal information.  That idea is fallacious and has no place 
in the border search context.”180 
2.  United States v. Kolsuz 
United States v. Kolsuz involved a traveler who was found with firearm 
parts in his luggage and was charged with arms smuggling.181  After 
defendant Hamza Kolsuz was detained at Washington Dulles International 
Airport, customs officers took his phone, manually examined his recent 
communications, and then transported the device elsewhere for an intensive 
forensic review.182  That month-long search, per the court, “yielded an 896-
page report that included Kolsuz’s personal contact lists, emails, messenger 
conversations, photographs, videos, calendar, web browsing history, and call 
logs, along with a history of Kolsuz’s physical location down to precise GPS 
coordinates.”183 
 
 174. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. 
 175. Id. at 966. 
 176. Id. at 962–63. 
 177. Id. at 966. 
 178. Id. at 965. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 975 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
 181. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 182. Id. at 139. 
 183. Id. 
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Kolsuz moved to suppress the forensic report, arguing that investigators 
should have been required to obtain a warrant before the search.184  After the 
district court denied the motion and convicted him at trial, relying in part on 
the report.185  Kolsuz appealed the denial and argued that his conviction 
should be overturned either because the border exception did not extend to 
his case186 or, in the alternative, because forensic device searches fall within 
the category of highly intrusive or nonroutine border searches that require 
greater individualized suspicion than a search of checked luggage would.187 
Kolsuz argued that the search was unconstitutional because it failed to 
meet the heightened standards required of especially invasive nonroutine 
border searches.188  Writing for the majority, Judge Pamela Ann Harris noted 
that “border searches of luggage, outer clothing, and personal effects 
consistently are treated as routine, while searches that are most invasive of 
privacy—strip searches, alimentary-canal searches, x-rays, and the like—are 
deemed nonroutine and permitted only with reasonable suspicion.”189  
Kolsuz argued that forensic searches are even more invasive than the physical 
searches the court enumerated, relying on Riley v. California’s recognition 
of the extraordinary volume of personal data that cell phones typically 
carry.190 
Judge Harris framed the result in Kolsuz as the logical extension of 
Supreme Court border search precedent in light of the decision in Riley.191  
The court noted that Supreme Court border search decisions have held that 
“individualized suspicion is necessary to justify certain ‘highly intrusive 
searches,’ in light of the significance of the individual ‘dignity and privacy 
interests’ infringed.”192  The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
“has not delineated precisely what makes a search nonroutine,” but it 
nonetheless concluded—citing Cotterman—that “there was a convincing 
case for categorizing forensic searches of digital devices as nonroutine” even 
prior to the Riley decision.193 
The Fourth Circuit indicated that Riley decisively foreclosed the argument 
that forensic searches are permissible without reasonable suspicion, noting 
that “the impact of Riley is plain enough that the government’s brief does not 
seriously contest this point.”194  The court observed:  “After Riley, we think 
it is clear that a forensic search of a digital phone must be treated as a 
 
 184. Id. at 139–40.  Kolsuz chose not to challenge the manual search of his phone because 
that search yielded no evidence used against him at trial. Id. at 140 n.2. 
 185. See id. at 140–41. 
 186. Id. at 140–42. 
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142–44. 
 188. See id. at 144–45. 
 189. Id. at 144. 
 190. See id. at 136–37. 
 191. See id. at 145–47. 
 192. Id. at 144 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)). 
 193. Id. at 144–45. 
 194. Id. at 146. 
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nonroutine border search, requiring some form of individualized 
suspicion.”195 
The Kolsuz decision expressly reserved the question of what standard 
should govern manual device searches that “do not entail the use of external 
equipment or software” because Kolsuz challenged only the forensic search 
of his phone, which relied on external implements.196  Pre-Riley Fourth 
Circuit precedent approved manual device searches without suspicion, as 
does the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cotterman.197  However, Riley seems to 
undermine this distinction:  the case itself involved manual cell phone 
searches.198 
B.  The Traditionalists Strike Back:  The Eleventh Circuit 
in United States v. Touset 
Two weeks after the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Kolsuz, the 
Eleventh Circuit weighed in on the application of the border search doctrine 
to electronic devices in United States v. Touset.  The case arose from the 
seizure—and subsequent forensic search—of several electronic devices 
taken from a U.S. traveler at the international airport in Atlanta.199 
Karl Touset ended up on law enforcement’s radar due to a series of 
payments he made to people in foreign countries who were suspected of 
distributing child pornography.200  Upon his return from an international trip, 
CBP officers inspected Touset’s luggage—but the manual search revealed 
no child pornography.201  The border officials, however, confiscated two 
laptops, two external hard drives, and two tablets for further forensic 
analysis, which revealed child pornography on the laptops and hard drives.202 
The district court denied Touset’s motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the border searches.203  Touset pled guilty to knowingly 
transporting child pornography and subsequently appealed the denial of his 
motion to suppress.204  On appeal, the government argued that “border agents 
need no justification whatsoever to detain (in this case for seventeen days) 
 
 195. Id.  But the court recognized that the government nonetheless had reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a forensic search of Kolsuz’s phone. Id. at 141. 
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and forensically search electronic devices of any American citizen returning 
from abroad.”205 
Touset followed another Eleventh Circuit case decided earlier in 2018, 
United States v. Vergara,206 which also concerned the application of the 
border search exception to a traveler’s electronic devices.207  In Vergara, the 
defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from two cell phones seized by border agents following a cruise to 
Mexico.208  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that 
these searches required a warrant in the wake of Riley.209  In a brief opinion, 
Judge William Pryor emphasized that Riley “expressly limited its holding to 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception” and therefore did not impose a 
warrant requirement for border searches.210  The defendant conceded that the 
government had reasonable suspicion for the search, so the Vergara court 
ultimately did not address the question of whether reasonable suspicion was 
required for the searches.211 
In Touset, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the reasoning in Kolsuz 
and Cotterman in holding that “precedents about border searches of property 
make clear that no suspicion is necessary to search electronic devices at the 
border.”212  Judge Pryor, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the Eleventh 
Circuit’s understanding that Riley does not apply at the border.213  The panel 
therefore remained “unpersuaded” by the routine-nonroutine search 
distinction highlighted in Cotterman and Kolsuz.214 
The Touset court emphasized that the Supreme Court rejected the 
distinction between routine and nonroutine searches of property in Flores-
Montano.215  Judge Pryor noted that the Supreme Court “rejected a judicial 
attempt to distinguish between ‘routine’ and ‘nonroutine’ searches” of a 
vehicle, “as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person.”216  The Touset 
court cited this as decisive support for the argument that any routine-
nonroutine distinction has no place in border searches of property:  “Property 
and persons are different.”217  Judge Pryor also pointed out that the only 
Supreme Court opinion requiring reasonable suspicion for a border search, 
 
 205. Id. at 1238–39 (Corrigan, J., concurring) (noting that this issue has never been before 
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United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,218 involved the search of a person 
rather than property.219 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that its own precedent reflects an unwillingness 
“to distinguish between different kinds of property.”220  The court ultimately 
“s[aw] no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require suspicion for a 
forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement 
for a search of other personal property.”221  If, the court reasoned, the Fourth 
Amendment does not require reasonable suspicion for the search of a crew 
member’s cabin on an incoming international cargo ship—“even though ‘[a] 
cabin is a crew member’s home,’” which “receives the greatest Fourth 
Amendment protection”—then it should not require any greater level of 
suspicion for border searches of electronic devices.222 
The panel explicitly rejected the notion that the storage capacity of modern 
electronic devices justified imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement on 
their searches at the border.223  Judge Pryor compared a modern electronic 
device to “a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractor-trailer 
loaded with boxes of documents”—neither of which triggers a requirement 
of reasonable suspicion for a search at the border.224  The Touset court further 
noted that “[b]order agents bear the same responsibility for preventing the 
importation of contraband in a traveler’s possession regardless of advances 
in technology.”225 
The Eleventh Circuit found that its traditional standard for measuring a 
search’s intrusiveness on the subject’s personal dignity was inapplicable to 
border searches of property—including electronic devices.226  The Eleventh 
Circuit traditionally measures “the ‘intrusiveness’ of a search of a person’s 
body that requires reasonable suspicion ‘in terms of the indignity that will be 
suffered by the person being searched.’”227  However, the court found that 
this exercise is misplaced in searches of electronic devices.228  “Although it 
may intrude on the privacy of the owner,” the court reasoned, “a forensic 
search of an electronic device is still a search of property”—and both 
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent require no reasonable 
suspicion for searches of property at the border.229 
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Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit was particularly unwilling to “create a 
special rule that will benefit offenders who now conceal contraband in a new 
kind of property”—in this case, child pornography on portable electronic 
devices.230  The court believed that imposing a reasonable suspicion standard 
would “create special protection for the property most often used to store and 
disseminate child pornography.”231 
The Touset decision, in its explicit rejection of Riley’s application at the 
border and its express disagreement with the reasoning in both Cotterman 
and Kolsuz, created a split among the circuit courts as to whether the 
traditional border search exception properly applies to electronic devices. 
III.  EVALUATING DIGITAL SEARCHES AT THE BORDER 
In light of the divergent approaches to electronic border searches across 
the Ninth, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, this Part argues that the circuit split 
should be resolved by requiring reasonable suspicion for all border searches 
of electronic devices.  This resolution is consistent with the Ninth and Fourth 
Circuits’ recognition that forensic searches of electronic devices require at 
least reasonable suspicion.232  The Supreme Court decisions in Riley and 
Carpenter affirm the enhanced Fourth Amendment concerns implicated by 
searches of digital devices.233  The spirit of these cases, coupled with an 
understanding of the nonroutine nature of digital searches, demands that the 
judiciary rethink the border exception as applied to searches of electronic 
devices.  Moreover, the imposition of a reasonable suspicion requirement for 
electronic border searches would not adversely impact national security and 
would fit more squarely with travelers’ Fourth Amendment interests. 
Part III.A discusses why the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Riley should 
carry weight in the context of searches of electronic devices performed at the 
border.  Part III.B argues that all border searches of electronic devices should 
be considered nonroutine in light of the emphasis in Riley and Carpenter on 
the substantial privacy interests that individuals possess in their digital data 
stored on electronic devices.  This Note concludes in Part III.C with a 
discussion of recent CBP policy changes, which largely endorse the 
recognition of heightened privacy interests implicated by searches of digital 
devices. 
A.  Why Riley Matters at the Border 
The Supreme Court in Riley recognized that searches of electronic devices 
are distinct from searches of other forms of property and therefore trigger 
greater Fourth Amendment concerns.234  The heightened privacy interests 
implicated by searches of electronic devices—highlighted in Riley and 
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Carpenter—should not go ignored at the border, where nearly every traveler 
carries an electronic device.235 
Traditional Fourth Amendment border doctrine balances substantial 
government interests against the diminished privacy interests of a traveler.236  
The concerns raised in Riley237 should tilt that balance less heavily in favor 
of the government.  The Court in Riley held, simply:  “Get a warrant.”238  The 
standard at the border should be:  “Get reasonable suspicion.”239 
Traditionalists insist that cell phones or laptops are no different than the 
letters or ship cabins of old in terms of the government’s border search 
authority—notwithstanding Riley’s observation that “a cell phone search 
would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive 
search of a house.”240  This discussion hinges on the question of whether cell 
phones and laptops are distinct from ordinary “cargo,” which does not merit 
special protection. 
Traditionalists argue that the Supreme Court foreclosed this logic with its 
decision in Flores-Montano, which rejected a reasonable suspicion 
requirement based on intrusiveness for the border search of a vehicle.241  
However, this argument does not properly account for the social and 
technological changes since that decision was issued in 2004.  The Court’s 
opinions in Riley and Carpenter highlight the immense importance of digital 
devices in our modern lives.242  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Touset that 
travelers can always leave their devices at home if they want privacy, but 
Riley properly recognized that cell phones are more nearly “an important 
feature of human anatomy” than they are “just another technological 
convenience.”243 
Neither the depth of private information accessible on an electronic device 
nor the traveler’s privacy interest in that information disappears at the border.  
The Riley and Carpenter decisions took great care to note the strong privacy 
interests inherent in electronic data—those decisions revisited longstanding 
exceptions to the warrant requirement in light of advancing technology.244  
To treat border searches of electronic devices as analytically equivalent to 
the search of a traveler’s luggage would be to ignore the unique quality and 
quantity245 of the data stored on digital devices.246  That the data stored on 
now-ubiquitous electronic devices is virtually impossible for a layperson to 
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remove provides even more reason to recognize that an electronic device is 
a distinct form of property, the search of which calls for individualized 
suspicion.247 
B.  All Border Searches of Electronic Devices 
Should Be Considered Nonroutine 
The Riley Court rejected distinguishing between different levels of a cell 
phone search.248  Similarly, courts should not distinguish between routine 
and nonroutine levels of intrusiveness for a border search of a digital device. 
In Cotterman, which was decided prior to Riley, the Ninth Circuit 
maintained a distinction between permissibly suspicionless routine manual 
searches and nonroutine forensic searches that require a greater level of 
suspicion.249  The Kolsuz court did not reach the question of the justification 
required for a manual border search of an electronic device, but the narrative 
thrust of the opinion appears to call for individualized suspicion for all border 
searches of cell phones.250 
The fact that a cell phone may be on the person at the time of arrest does 
not insulate the cell phone from the warrant requirement.251  The search-
incident-to-arrest exception did not justify dispensing with the warrant 
requirement before officers could search digital data on cell phones under 
either the traditional concern for the officers’ safety or the fear of evidence 
destruction.252  Likewise, the fact that a digital device is carried by an 
international traveler should not exempt the digital device from the protection 
of a reasonable suspicion requirement. 
The circuit split can be resolved and reconciled with Riley by establishing 
that all digital border searches should be categorized as nonroutine—and thus 
should require reasonable suspicion.  This treatment would recognize the 
unique privacy interests in digital data highlighted in Riley and Carpenter253 
without substantially upsetting the government’s traditional right to secure 
and protect the border.254 
C.  DHS Agrees:  Requiring Reasonable Suspicion for Device Searches 
Will Not Harm National Security 
Mandating reasonable suspicion for digital searches acknowledges 
travelers’ expectation of privacy in digital devices at the border and does not 
interfere with border agents’ ability to do their job.  The Department of 
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Homeland Security recognizes this:  in January 2018, DHS withdrew a 2009 
policy authorizing warrantless, suspicionless searches of electronic devices 
and replaced it with an updated policy calling for at least reasonable 
suspicion for some device searches.255 
The new DHS policy, which cites Cotterman among its influences,256 
divides electronic-device searches into two categories:  the basic search 
(manual) and the advanced search (forensic).257  The 2018 policy requires 
agents to have reasonable suspicion of “activity in violation of the laws 
enforced or administered by CBP” or a “national security concern,” as well 
as “supervisory approval,” to justify the advanced search.258  All other 
searches require no individualized suspicion.259 
The 2009 CBP policy, which governed border searches of electronic 
devices at the time of the searches at issue in the cases discussed in this 
Note,260 did not distinguish between a basic and advanced search and, in fact, 
allowed any search to be performed without individualized suspicion.261  
Likewise, the earlier policy permitted confiscation of an electronic device for 
an on- or off-site search without any level of suspicion.262 
CBP states that the new policy “will continue to protect the rights of 
individuals against unreasonable search and seizure and ensure privacy 
protections while accomplishing its border security and enforcement 
missions.”263  That the agency adopted a policy requiring reasonable 
suspicion for certain searches—even though the agency maintains that the 
law does not require individualized suspicion264—amounts to a recognition 
that a reasonable suspicion policy, for at least forensic border searches of 
electronic devices, does not pose a substantial national security risk. 
Reasonable suspicion imposes a minimal requirement, just the next level 
up from no suspicion at all.265  In each of the circuit court cases profiled in 
Part II, the court found that border agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct 
searches of the travelers’ devices.266  Border agents rarely undertake lengthy, 
expensive forensic searches of travelers’ digital devices for no particular 
reason.267  The agency noted that its agents are professionals and often will 
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not conduct laptop searches unless facts and circumstances create 
individualized suspicion—a standard not required by law.268 
As the Kolsuz majority noted:  “That the agency has chosen to adopt [the 
Cotterman] requirements, of course, does not establish that they are 
constitutionally mandated.”269  Travelers deserve to have the reasonable 
suspicion standard for electronic searches recognized by the judiciary rather 
than simply accepted as current DHS policy.270 
CONCLUSION 
It seems increasingly likely that the Supreme Court will need to resolve 
how the border search exception applies to government searches of electronic 
devices.  In the meantime, thousands of travelers’ digital devices will be 
subject to search at the border.  The circuit split has significant impact on the 
millions of travelers—many of whom travel with confidential or highly 
sensitive business information—that pass through the U.S. borders each year 
and the agents responsible for protecting those borders.  Minimal harm will 
result from imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement for border searches 
of electronic devices.  Calling for reasonable suspicion for border searches 
of electronic devices properly recognizes both Riley’s Fourth Amendment 
concerns regarding digital searches and the longstanding right of a sovereign 
nation to protect its borders. 
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